

**Remarks of Dr. Mowaffak al Rubaie
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INTRODUCTION

Honorable sponsors, distinguished guests, and fellow participants and attendees: I am honored to address you to offer my perspectives on the status of the Republic of Iraq's overall requirements for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.

I will focus on the "big picture" underscoring the needs of Iraq's national leadership for capable, reliable, and highly professional police and military forces with the ISR capabilities needed to secure the country and its citizens against domestic and foreign challengers.

My remarks are offered as an informed private citizen who had the privilege of serving Iraq as its National Security Advisor for nearly seven years, during the period of formation of its current democratic political and national security institutions.

I would like to begin with some introductory considerations that I ask you to keep in mind as I get into the details of my presentation:

- First permit me to unscramble some terms and abbreviations in order to avoid confusion. Often, experts in the areas we are addressing in this symposium put together abbreviations such as C2, C4, ISR, and the all-inclusive C4ISR. To those who are not experts it may seem that each of these

abbreviations have unambiguous meanings. I will not make that assumption.

- I will differentiate command from control, computers from communications, and intelligence from surveillance and reconnaissance.
 - I will also address the requirements for law and policy in assuring Iraq can adequately develop its needed police and military capabilities.
- Second, I want to summarize some missing elements of Iraq's legal and policy framework for organizing and conducting its national security affairs.
 - Iraq attempted for most of the period of the first administration of PM Maliki to develop a law for the organization and control of police and military forces. Some of our US advisors liked to use the term "National Security Architecture" as shorthand for the elements of this needed piece of legislation. This task turned out to be too ambitious at that time, and even to the present time, due to the lack of a political consensus. Absent this consensus, the obvious need for the integration of forces in order to achieve the best use of all capabilities simply fell victim to the arguments of each of the individual force elements to prevent being subordinated to anyone else.
 - Iraq also attempted to develop a law for the organization and control of its intelligence elements. This task also turned out to be premature as the individual intelligence elements resisted integration and subordination.

- Third, despite the difficulties of drafting and passing the needed laws, Iraq did succeed in preparing and adopting a National Security Strategy for the period 2007 through 2010. This seminal effort provided the overall guidance to Iraq's security and intelligence ministries, agencies, and forces to facilitate a significant degree of unity of effort in spite of the lack of unity of command in many cases.
 - The current administration has not yet undertaken an update of the 2007-2010 Strategy. The many challenges the Government has been facing have taken a higher priority, and rightly so.
 - In due course, Iraq will update its strategy especially now that all foreign military forces have departed. In the meantime, the 2007-2010 Strategy offers still useful guidelines for its security and intelligence entities. Those of you who are unfamiliar with the 2007-2010 document might wish to review it to confirm my assessment that it remains, largely, valid.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS

In turning now to Iraq's capabilities and requirements for intelligence and for intelligence systems, I want to begin with a general statement:

- National leaders' requirements for intelligence are common across essentially all countries, developed and developing, democratic and authoritarian. All want to know what current and potential threats are

doing and planning, and what capabilities they have to carry out their purposes.

- Iraq is no different in terms of its fundamental intelligence requirements:
 - There is a significant terrorist threat that dominates the need for domestic intelligence; as well as a significant amount of criminal activity about which intelligence is also required.
 - Iraq continues to suffer from its relatively porous borders that permit support of domestic terrorism from entities abroad. And, while from time to time more or less support comes into Iraq from abroad, this remains a significant intelligence challenge.
 - At present, thankfully Iraq has no imminent large threat to the integrity of its territory. Nevertheless, it would be irresponsible for Iraq to act as if it had no need for intelligence on potential conventional threats. Indeed, the better informed Iraq is about the capabilities and limitations of countries and groups able to operate across borders, the better off Iraq is in devising bilateral and multilateral security arrangements, while at the same time building its capabilities for ultimate territorial defense of its sovereignty including air sovereignty.
- Where Iraq differs from many other countries is in that up to the end of 2011, the United States had very robust intelligence systems in operation in Iraq offering support to Iraq well beyond Iraq's own capabilities. And, although some of this support continues, Iraq's requirements to develop its own

intelligence systems now rise to a very high priority indeed.

Since the re-establishment of Iraq's police and military forces starting in 2004, with the help of friends from the United States, Iraq has put in place a basic intelligence system. There is an ongoing requirement, of course, for further development of this system including its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance elements – especially following the withdrawal of US military forces end of last year. Here are the major areas of need, in my opinion:

Further improvement of leader development and training institutions: Iraq has a good start but still needs to add depth and scope to be able to develop leaders at all levels, and to train its operatives in all required skills. The school system in particular needs continued support from countries with the most modern intelligence capabilities.

One of the challenges we were facing is converting the operators previous knowledge of the old tricks of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. We have to get them to let go of their old habits and help them learn newer and better techniques. We moved on to the younger generations of 25 years old and they are fresh and moldable and the training is easier because there are no techniques to correct.

Many of the Iraqi air force pilots are honored to have an active role in bringing their country back to a semblance of its former glory as well as help provide the security necessary to keep their country safe. They are also proud that they were trained by the Americans.

- Adopting computer literacy and the ability to operate modern information technology systems requirements for every member of the Iraqi police and military forces; and ensuring the respective school systems are upgraded to be able to meet these requirements.
- Formal codification in policy, law, and procedures for the integration of intelligence agency efforts, and definitive assignment of their missions and functions to avoid gaps or unwanted overlaps in capabilities.
- Specific improvements or wholly new programs to provide Iraq:
 - A capability for lawful intercept of electronic communications for the purposes of law enforcement, counterterrorism, counternarcotics and counterespionage.
 - Enhancement of Iraq's very elementary signals intelligence capabilities to permit support for police and military counterterrorism and conventional defense operations in real time.
 - Enhancement of Iraq's surveillance systems to permit continuous all-weather monitoring of Iraq's borders and sensitive sites, with real-time display of data at appropriate local, regional, and national intelligence and operations centers.
 - Expansion of Iraq's manned and unmanned airborne platforms and sensor suites to provide reliable, continuous real time capabilities in

threatened areas throughout Iraq including its territorial waters.

- Reaching agreement with friendly countries and international organizations for sharing of intelligence products in support of law enforcement and national defense objectives.

SUMMARY

Iraq has made a good start at meeting its needs for self-reliance in the areas of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in support of law enforcement and defense requirements. Realistically, though, especially in light of the complete withdrawal of US military forces in 2011, Iraq has a long way to go.

Events such as this MEISR Symposium facilitate broader understanding by neighbors and experts of Iraq's status and requirements, and expand the understand of Iraq's practitioners of the state of the art in the most developed countries that may be available to permit Iraq to meet its requirements.

It's important that we build ourselves strong enough to protect our country. For too long we have let USF do this for us and we need to step in and take responsibility for our country and protect it ourselves. The U.S. has given us a lot but we need to take over and that is we have done.

One very important lesson we learned the hard way is: ISR cannot replace human intelligence and social networks, but when used properly they creat significant advantages. Thank you.....

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